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RECENT DECISIONS
CRIMINAL LAW - ARREST BY POLICE OFFICER WITHOUT
WARRANT - REQUIREmENT THAT MISDEMEANOR BE COMMrITTED IN
ARRESTING OFFICER's PRESENCE. - In two separate New York
cases defendants were convicted after trial of misdemeanors re-
lating to bookmaking.1 In each the prosecution utilized evidence
obtained by the arresting officer without a search or arrest warrant.
The arrests were made pursuant to Section 177 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure 2 which authorizes an arrest for a misdemeanor
if the crime is committed in the arresting officer's presence. In
the first case, the arresting officer observed defendant Caliente
receiving paper money and paper slips from unidentified persons.
The contents of the slips were unknown to the officer. On these
facts he made his arrest.
In the second case the police officer made three telephone calls
during which he placed wagers on horse races and baseball games.
He did not know who had accepted his wagers, but he did know
that the telephone number was listed in the name of Lang Premiums.
After calling, he stationed himself outside the room in which the
telephone was located. He then took a pencil, stuck it into the
mail slot on the door and for the first time saw defendants Perlman
and Bernstein. After observing them answer the phone and
hearing their voices, he knew that they were the ones who
accepted his wagers. Using a pass key the police officer entered
and made his arrest. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
both convictions holding that in the case of a no-warrant mis-
demeanor arrest, no misdemeanor is committed in the arresting
officer's presence unless what he directly observes or hears is
sufficient, in and of itself, to sustain a conviction. People v.
Caliente, 12 N.Y.2d 89, 187 N.E.2d 550, 236 N.Y.S.2d .945
(1962).
The Supreme Court of the United States in an historic de-
cision, Mapp v. Ohio,' has ruled that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures, by public officers, in violation of the fourth
amendment to the Constitution, is inadmissible in a state court.
Thus the federal exclusionary rule 4 has become the law of New
1 N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 986, 986-b.
2 N.Y. CoDE CRIM. PROC. § 177 provides: "A peace officer may, without
a warrant, arrest a person, 1. For a crime, committed or attempted in his
presence. ..."
3367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4The federal exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of evidence ob-
tained by the police as a result of an unreasonable search and seizure.
It has been followed by the federal courts since 1914. Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 208-10 (1960). The basis of the exclusionary rule is
best summarized in the following manner: If the evidence seized in violation
of the fourth amendment can be used against the accused his right against
such searches and seizures is of no value, and might as well be stricken
from the Constitution. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
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York State by constitutional command. Prior to this decision
New York had followed the admissibility rule.5 Under this rule,
evidence obtained by the police as a result of an illegal search and
seizure could be introduced against the defendant at trial. The
Mapp decision has changed this. If the arrest is unlawful, the
search incident thereto is also unlawful, and the fruit of that
search is not admissible in evidence.
In applying this principle 6 to the instant decisions, it is
necessary to look at the New York arrest statutes,7 in order to
determine under what circumstances a police officer may make a
legal arrest. With a valid warrant of arrest, a police officer may
make an arrest for a felony, a misdemeanor, an offense or a traffic
infraction,8 whether or not the crime is committed in his presence.
The method and time of executing an arrest warrant are set forth
in the statutes. Compliance is mandatory." If the statutes are
not complied with in making the arrest, any search incidental to
such arrest is unreasonable and any evidence thereby obtained
is inadmissible.
When arresting without a warrant, a police officer may arrest
for any felony, misdemeanor, offense or traffic infraction' 0 com-
mitted or attempted in his presence." A police officer with but
two exceptions 12 may never arrest without a warrant for a mis-
5 The New York courts have examined the issue on four principal
occasions and in each rejected the exclusionary rule for the courts of the
state. People v. Richter's Jewelers, Inc., 291 N.Y. 161, 51 N.E.2d 690(1943); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S.657 (1926); People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923); People
v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636 (1903), aff'd, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).6 See SoBaE, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIztUE (1962). In his survey
of the law of search and seizure, Judge Sobel discusses the practical effect
of the Mapp decision on the criminal law and procedure of New York
State.
7 N.Y. CoDE CRim. PRoc. §§ 167-182.
8 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 150. A traffic infraction is deemed to be a
misdemeanor for purposes of procedure. Squadrito v. Griebsch, 1 N.Y.2d 471,
476-77, 136 N.E.2d 504, 507-08, 154 N.Y.S.2d 37, 41-42 (1956).
9 People v. Baxter, 178 Misc. 625, 36 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (Oneida County
Ct. 1942).
10 N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 155.
11N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 177(1).
12Under § 602 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, a peace
officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person, in case of a violation of
either §600 or §601 (leaving the scene of an accident without reporting;
leaving the scene of an injury to certain animals without reporting), which
in fact has been committed, though not in his presence, when he has
reasonable cause to believe that the violation was committed by such person.
Also, by authority of § 1193 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law a police officer
may in the same manner as provided above in § 602 arrest a person in
case of a violation of § 1192 (operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle while
in an intoxicated condition), if such violation is coupled with an accident or
collision in which such person is involved.
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demeanor, offense or traffic infraction not committed in his
presence.'3 Every such arrest is invalid as is every search in-
cidental to it. The police officer has one remaining avenue of
arrest open to him. He may arrest without a warrant for a crime
not committed in his presence when he has probable cause to
believe that a felony has been committed and probable cause to
believe that the person arrested committed it, though it should
afterward appear that no felony has been committed, or, if com-
mitted, that the person arrested did not commit it.14 Prior to
1958, the statute required that a felony must in fact have been
committed, but due to an. amendment in that year,15 it is now
sufficient if the officer has probable cause to believe the crime to be
a felony, although it is later discovered that in fact it was a
misdemeanor or, indeed, no crime at all.
The primary concern in the two instant cases is a misdemeanor
arrest without an arrest or search warrant. For such an arrest
to be legal, the crime must have been committed in the arresting
officer's presence. Prior to Mapp, the courts of New York did
not give much thought to "presence." Since New York followed
the admissibility rule, even if the arrest was invalid, evidence
thereby obtained could still be used to convict the accused.
An early New York case16 which did consider the presence
problem laid down a liberal standard. The court said: "Personal
presence includes corporeal extension within the sphere of sense
perception. Presence is not the same as view." 17 Since the
statute did not specify how much evidence the officer had to
perceive, the court laid down the following rule to guide police
officers in making no-warrant misdemeanor arrests:
If a police officer is in bodily reach of a person then and there actually
engaged in the commission of a misdemeanor, and perceiving indications
of the commission of the offense sufficient to induce reasonable belief
intending performance of duty, proceeds to arrest such person, the arrest
is lawful as for the commission of a crime in the officer's presence.18
The courts at this time considered that the purpose of allowing
arrests without a warrant was to secure apprehension and iden-
13 People v. Foster, 10 N.Y.2d 99, 106-07, 176 N.E.2d 397, 401, 217
N.Y.S.2d 596, 601 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
14 N.Y. CODE CIum. PRoc. § 177(4).
15 Ibid.
16People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 872, 194 N.Y. Supp. 326, 332 (Ct.
Spec. Sess. 1922) (memorandum decision). For a case that discusses the
presence problem in depth, see Agnello v. United States, 290 Fed. 671,
678-79 (2d Cir. 1923).
17 People v. Esposito, supra note 16, at 872, 194 N.Y. Supp. at 332.
's People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 872-73, 194 N.Y. Supp. 326, 332-33
(Ct. Spec. Sess. 1922) (memorandum decision).
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tification with promptness.19 This attitude is evident in the above
guide, which placed great emphasis on the good faith belief of
the arresting officer.
In recent years, the concept of "presence" and the purpose
behind the no-warrant arrest statute has undergone a change
in the minds of the New York judiciary. They no longer em-
phasize that the purpose of the no-warrant arrest is to secure
apprehension and identification with promptness. Conceding that
this is still the main idea behind allowing them, the courts now
call attention to the presence requirement set forth in the statute
as a protection to our citizens against lawless law enforcement.2 0
Today, a speedy arrest will be upheld only if it is a lawful one.
To be a lawful arrest, the courts require strict compliance with
the presence requirement of the no-warrant arrest statute. The
liberal standard of the past has gone and a rigid standard has
taken its place.
Cases like People v. Moore 21 demonstrate the new rule. In
the Moore case, the police officer saw four men severally approach
the defendant and hand him paper money. The court said:
The officer's testimony of what he observed would not, without more, prove
the commission of any crime since mere evidence of persons handing money
to another person does not prove a crime.22
It can be seen that the courts are no longer referring to the
officer's reasonable or good faith belief as factors making a no-
warrant misdeameanor arrest legal. As held in Moore, the officer
must observe the elements of the crime, suspicion being insufficient
justification for making the arrest.
The majority opinion in the instant cases further emphasizes
the strict approach to the presence requirement in the no-warrant
arrest statute. The rule to be derived from both cases is to the
effect that what is directly observed and heard must, in and of
itself, sustain a conviction. That is to say, unless sufficient evidence
to convict is apparent to the arresting officer, the crime is not
committed in his "presence." Therefore, the arrest is unlawful
and any further evidence seized incident thereto is inadmissible,
notwithstanding the degree of probable cause for the arrest or the
19 Id. at 872, 194 N.Y. Supp. at 332.
20 "The investigation of crime does not require and, certainly, does not
justify a disregard of basic rights on the part of law enforcement officials.
The legislature has deliberately and carefully enacted legislation authorizing
an arrest without a warrant in limited fact situations, and police officers
may not ignore the law's demands because they believe that effective
policing or the end in view calls for such conduct." People v. Cherry,
307 N.Y. 308, 311, 121 N.E.2d 238, 240 (1954).
21 11 N.Y.2d 271, 183 N.E.2d 225, 228 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1962).2 2 Id. at 273, 183 N.E.2d at 226, 228 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
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persuasiveness of the additional evidence. The Court in Caliente
ruled that the mere act of accepting money and pieces of paper,
without more, does not constitute a crime. In Perlman and
Bernstein, the Court ruled that placing bets over the telephone
with persons then unknown did not constitute a crime being
committed in the officer's presence.
From these two decisions, it appears that the Court is requiring
the arresting officer to have knowledge of both the person and
the criminal act in order for a crime to have been committed in
his presence. In the Caliente case, the officer had knowledge of
the person, but he could not know from the evidence before
him that a criminal act was being committed. In the Perlman
and Bernstein case, the officer had knowledge of the criminal
act since he was a party thereto, but he did not know the identity
of the criminals. The fact that he later learned their identities
by pushing back the mail slot does not change the rule. If
the officer did not have cause to make the arrest before such
observation was made, his act constituted an unreasonable search 23
and all evidence thereby obtained was inadmissible.2 4
Judge Dye, in his dissent, argued that even if the search and
seizure were illegal, there was no showing that these defendants
had any standing to object to the right of privacy allegedly invaded.
The theory behind this position is that under the exclusionary
rule, the evidence is excluded in order to provide a remedy for
a wrong done to the defendant. Therefore, if the defendant has
not been wronged, he is not entitled to the relief of the ex-
clusionary rule. Accordingly, no wrong is inflicted upon the
defendants unless they can show that they have an interest in the
premises searched. Since this was not shown, Judge Dye con-
cluded that no wrong was committed which would require resort
to the exclusionary rule. The rule has been firmly established,
however, that if a person is charged with the possession of the
fruits of an illegal search and seizure,25 he is the person aggrieved
by the search and seizure.26  Such person may then move to
23 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15-17 (1948).
24 People v. O'Neill, 11 N.Y.2d 148, 153, 182 N.E.2d 95, 98, 227 N.Y.S.2d
416, 419 (1962).2 5 N.Y. PEN. LAw § 986(b) provides: "Any person .... who shall
knowingly have possession of any writing, paper or document representing
or being a record, made by a person engaged in bookmaking . . . shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor."
26jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). The issue of de-
fendant's standing was decided with reference to Rule 41(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure which states: "A person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure may move . . . to suppress for use as evidence
anything so obtained. . . ." Jones v. United States, supra at 260. The
Court in ruling on defendant's standing said: "In cases where the indictment
itself charges possession, the defendant in a very real sense is revealed
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suppress the evidence without first showing that he has an
interest in property seized, or in the premises searched. 27  New
York has apparently adopted this approach, for in People v.
Loria 28 the court sustained the right of a defendant to suppress
evidence seized in, the home of another. Defendants Perlman
and Bernstein were entitled to the protection of this rule since
they were being charged with possession of bookmaking records.
29
Judge Burke dissented 30 on, different grounds than did Judge
Dye. He expressed the view that probable cause should be
sufficient to justify a misdemeanor no-warrant arrest. He stated
that if the majority rule were adopted, the Court would be faced
with the task of reviewing countless "no-warrant misdemeanor
convictions to determine not only if there is sufficient evidence
to support the conviction, but, collaterally, whether such evidence
was apparent to the arresting officer prior to the search." I1
judge Burke would appear to be advocating a return to the result
reached at a time when the rapid apprehension of the misdemeanor
criminal was the paramount consideration in the courts' con-
struction of the presence requirement in Section 177 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. 2 This, however, is no longer the view
of the courts. As Judge Fuld stated in People v. Lane,3
What is significant and decisive is that "the imperative of judicial integrity"
demands that the court should give sanction neither to illegal enforcement
of the criminal law nor to the corrosive doctrine that the end justifies the
means.
3 4
It is apparent that important legal and social questions are
involved in these cases. The primary question is whether or not
as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure.... .".Jones
v. United States, supra at 264.
27 Jones v. United States, supra note 26, at 261-65.
28 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1961).
29 N.Y. PEN. LAw § 986(b).
30 Judge Burke concurred in People v. Moore, 11 N.Y.2d 371, 183 N.E2d
225, 228 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1962), which had facts similar to People v. Caliente
in that paper money was passed in both cases. However, the Caliente case
had the additional fact of paper slips being passed. Judge Burke perhaps
felt this was sufficient to spell out the commission of a crime in the
arresting officer's presence.
31 People v. Caliente, 12 N.Y.2d 89, 99, 187 N.E.2d 550, 555, 236 N.Y.S.2d
945, 952 (1962).
32 People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 872, 194 N.Y. Supp. 326, 332 (Ct.
Spec. Sess. 1922).
38 10 N.Y.2d 347, 179 N.E.2d 339, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1961).3 4 Id. at 357, 179 N.E.2d at 342, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 202. See also Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion). "Our
Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example. . . . If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law. .. ."
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the presence requirement ought to be strictly enforced. The conflict
exists between a strict interpretation which emphasizes the personal
liberty of the individual and a liberal interpretation which em-
phasizes the maintenance of public order and the dispensing of
justice. Certainly there is something to be said for both sides.
But it would appear that any hedging on the strict application
of protections from the power of the state involves great risks
to individual freedom. The fact that it has been contended that
an estimated seventy-five per cent of arrests made today are illegal 35
indicates that many law enforcement officers are either willing to
make illegal arrests, or are unaware of the requirements of a
lawful arrest. If personal liberty is to be protected, the burden
falls on the members of the judiciary who can preserve it by
strictly enforcing the presently existing statutory requirements for
a legal arrest. If this course of action makes too onerous the
task of law enforcement officers, the solution lies in a modification
of the laws governing arrest. This should be accomplished by
legislative action, not by a failure of the courts to strictly enforce
the law as presently written.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION - REMOVAL By THIRD-PARTY DEFEND-
ANT TO A DISTICT COURT UNDER § 1441 OF THE JUDICIAL CODE.-
In an action between two citizens of New York, not involving a
federal question, defendant served a third-party complaint on a
citizen of California who then had the action removed to a federal
district court. The third-party defendant maintained the district
court had jurisdiction on two grounds: (1) the diversity required
by section 1441(b) of the Judicial Code 1 existed between the
movant and the third-party plaintiff, and (2) under section 1441 (c) ,2
35 HouTs, FRom ARPEST To RELEAsE 24 (1958).
128 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1958). "Any civil action of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under
the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable
without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other
such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properlyjoined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such
action is brought."
2 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1958). '"Whenever a separate and independent claim
or cause of action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined
with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the
entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues
therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its
original jurisdiction."
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